Portfolio Constraints and Contagion in Emerging Markets by Anna Ilyina
351
IMF Staff Papers
Vol. 53, No. 3
© 2007 International Monetary Fund
Portfolio Constraints and Contagion  
in Emerging Markets
AnnA ILyInA*
The objective of this paper is twofold: (1) to analyze an optimal portfolio rebalanc-
ing by a fund manager in response to a “volatility shock” in one of the asset mar-
kets, under sufficiently realistic assumptions about the fund manager’s performance 
criteria and portfolio restrictions; and (2) to analyze how the composition of the 
investor base determines the sensitivity of equilibrium asset prices to a shock origi-
nating in one of the fundamentally unrelated asset markets. The analysis confirms 
that certain combinations of portfolio constraints (notably short-sale constraints 
and benchmark-based performance criteria) can create an additional transmission 
mechanism for propagating shocks across fundamentally unrelated asset markets. 
The paper also discusses potential implications of recent and ongoing changes in 
the investor base for asset price volatility in emerging markets. [JEL G11, G12]
A 
recurrent theme in the fast-growing literature on financial contagion is conta-
gion through portfolio reallocations unrelated to “fundamental” factors, that 
is, factors that determine the value of an asset. In this literature, the behavior of inves-
tors who choose to adjust their exposure to a particular asset in response to new 
information unrelated to asset fundamentals may or may not be fully rational.1 The 
environments where such response may be rational include the ones where investors 
act strategically, taking into account the actions of other market participants, or where 
investors act as price takers, but are subject to portfolio constraints that create links 
*The author is a Senior Economist in the Policy Development and Review Department of the IMF. The 
author would like to thank Jorge Roldos and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
1The not-fully-rational behavior is often referred to as “herding” or “following the market.” See, for 
example, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) for a review of different 
approaches toward modeling herding in financial markets.Anna Ilyina
352
between their positions in the fundamentally unrelated markets. The latter will be the 
focus of this paper.2
The objective of this paper is twofold:
(1)    To analyze optimal portfolio rebalancing by a fund manager in response to a “vola-
tility shock” in one of the asset markets, under sufficiently realistic assumptions 
about the fund manager’s performance criteria and portfolio constraints; and
(2)    To analyze how the composition of the investor base determines the sensitivity 
of equilibrium asset prices to a shock originating in one of the fundamentally 
unrelated asset markets.
Why are these issues important? First, when regulators design investment guide-
lines for mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, their first priority 
is investor protection; the potential impact of these guidelines on the portfolio allo-
cation decisions of institutional investors and, in turn, on asset price dynamics are 
rarely taken into account. Second, in less liquid markets (including most emerging 
markets) and, particularly, in those where foreign institutional investors account for 
a large share of asset holdings and turnover, portfolio rebalancing by large investors 
in response to local and external shocks may have significant implications for asset 
price movements. Thus, a better understanding of the role played by different types of 
institutional investors in propagating shocks across asset markets is critical to under-
standing the extent to which assets prices, particularly in emerging markets, may be 
driven by factors unrelated to asset fundamentals.
Over the past decade, the participation of foreign institutional investors in emerg-
ing debt and equity markets increased dramatically, driven by the capital account 
liberalization and improved credit fundamentals in many emerging market (EM) 
countries, as well as by the relaxation of investment restrictions for institutional inves-
tors in mature market (MM) countries. Figures 1 and 2 show the shares of EM equity 
and debt instruments held by foreign investors in selected EM countries.
Virtually all types of foreign institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, 
hedge funds, and proprietary trading desks of major investment banks) are present 
in emerging securities markets. Although it is difficult to find a comprehensive data 
source on foreign holdings of EM securities, it is possible to gauge the proportions of 
the main types of foreign institutional investors in EMs by looking at the client base 
of major investment banks. For instance, based on JPMorgan’s client survey of for-
eign investors in emerging debt markets (EDMs),3 the proportion of crossover inves-
tors and trading accounts has declined in the past five years from about 50 percent to   
30 percent, whereas the share of dedicated EM investors has increased (as local investors in 
EM domestic debt securities were added to the survey at the end of 2003) (see Figure 3).4
2The framework used here is similar to that in Chakravorti, Ilyina, and Lall (2003).
3EDM is the market for the dollar- or euro-denominated Eurobonds issued by the EM sovereigns and 
corporates.
4The term “dedicated EM investor” typically refers to an asset manager who has a mandate to invest exclu-
sively in EM securities. Such an investor is usually benchmarked against an EM index (that is, investor perfor-
mance is measured relative to the performance of an EM benchmark portfolio). The term “crossover investor” 
typically refers to an asset manager who does not have an EM-specific mandate, but can invest in the EM securi-
ties that are part of the asset class that is specified in his or her investment mandate (equity or fixed income). Such 
an investor may or may not be benchmarked against an index that includes EM assets. (For instance, for the U.S. 
high-grade or U.S. high-yield bond fund manager, the EM dollar-denominated bond exposure represents an “out-
of-index” bet; such investors would typically cross over into EMs to pick up yield.)PORtfOLIO COnStRAIntS AnD COntAGIOn In EMERGInG MARkEtS
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Figure 1.  Cross-Border Portfolio Investment in EM Equity Securities
(As a percent share of equity market capitalization)
Dedicated investors’ allocations to the EM asset class are generally viewed as 
more stable (“sticky”) than those of crossover investors and trading accounts. This 
is because the latter are typically not benchmarked against an EM index, and their 
investment decisions tend to be more sensitive to the developments in competing 
asset classes. For example, the U.S. high-grade/high-yield funds may change their 
EM allocations in response to developments in the U.S. corporate bond market.   
However, a larger share of dedicated investors in the foreign investor base for a 
particular EM does not necessarily imply that foreign holdings of securities in that 
particular EM would be more stable. This paper, for example, shows that excessive Anna Ilyina
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Figure 2.  Cross-Border Portfolio Investment in EM Debt Securities
(As a percent share of debt market capitalization)
price volatility unrelated to fundamentals in a particular asset market can be gener-
ated by the portfolio reallocations of dedicated fund managers that are subject to 
multiple portfolio constraints.
Various strands of the contagion literature study the implications of institutional 
differences between investors for the “transmission” of shocks across asset markets. 
Papers by Schinasi and Smith (2000) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000) analyze conta-
gion in the context of a single-investor decision problem. On the other hand, Kodres 
and Pritsker (2002); Kyle and Xiong (2001); and Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand PORtfOLIO COnStRAIntS AnD COntAGIOn In EMERGInG MARkEtS
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(2004) study the impact of portfolio reallocations by different types of investors on 
price dynamics in a general equilibrium framework. Instead of presenting a com-
prehensive overview of the literature on financial contagion, the rest of this section 
will focus on the discussion of the papers that are most closely related to the exercise 
presented here.
Schinasi and Smith (2000) study the optimal portfolio rebalancing in response 
to two types of shocks—an increase in volatility in one of the asset markets (“vola-
tility event”) and a capital loss (“capital event”). They consider different portfolio 
management rules within a partial equilibrium mean-variance framework, allowing 
portfolio managers to take both long and short positions (no short-sale constraints). 
They find that only in the case of a positive covariance between asset returns does 
a volatility event in one asset market lead to an adjustment of positions in other 
assets.5 Furthermore, a leveraged investor always reduces risky asset positions 
when the return on the leveraged portfolio falls below the cost of funding. In this 
paper, we consider a broader class of portfolio management rules, including rules 
where the portfolio managers’ compensation is explicitly linked to the performance 
of a benchmark index and where fund managers may be subject to short-sale con-
straints. In contrast with Schinasi and Smith (2000), in this paper asset values are 
assumed to be uncorrelated, so that any possible contagion effects cannot be attrib-
uted to “fundamental” links between asset markets.
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) study the implications of institutional restrictions 
(in particular, the short-sale constraint) on investors’ incentives to gather costly 
5Schinasi and Smith argue that this is the most relevant case because asset returns are generally posi-
tively correlated across countries.
Figure 3.  Assets Under Management of EM Debt Investors
(In percent)
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information and take positions based on their private information, as opposed to 
imitating arbitrary market portfolios. They find that, in the presence of short-sale 
constraints, the gains from acquiring information at a fixed cost may diminish as 
markets grow (that is, as the number of assets increases). In this paper, the analy-
sis is focused on what happens when the short-sale constraint is combined with 
other institutional restrictions, such as the benchmark-linked performance criterion, 
and whether this can create an additional transmission mechanism for contagion 
through portfolio rebalancing.
Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2004) investigate the implications of the wide-
spread adoption of value-at-risk (VaR) risk management techniques on asset price 
dynamics in a general equilibrium framework. A comparison of the simulated dynam-
ics of asset prices with the use of VaR techniques against the asset price dynamics 
without VaR reveals that (1) prices are lower with VaR constraints, (2) troughs in the 
price paths with VaR constraints following a negative shock are deeper and longer, 
and (3) the variance of returns is larger with VaR constraints than without them.6 
These results raise more general concerns that the widespread use of certain com-
binations of portfolio constraints (including those that restrict the fund manager’s 
portfolio choices in the interests of investor protection) may have a systematic nega-
tive impact on asset price dynamics.
I. The Model
Asset Markets
Consider a simple discrete time environment with three risky assets—two EM assets 
(or portfolios of assets) A and B, and one MM asset (or portfolio of assets) Z—and 
one riskless asset, cash. The EM assets are assumed to have higher return and higher 
volatility than the MM assets. There are two periods: the current period (t = 0) and 
the terminal period (t = 1). Investors make their portfolio decisions in period 0, 
based on their expectations about asset values in the terminal period, and liqui-











1 denotes the value of asset i in the terminal period and P
i
0 denotes
the equilibrium price determined by the supply and demand conditions in asset 
market i in the current period.
The terminal values of all assets are normally distributed with means µi and 
variances σ
2
i, which are commonly known among investors. These probability 
distributions can be interpreted as representing uncertainty about the fundamental 
values of assets. To isolate the impact of portfolio allocation decisions by different 
types of investors on equilibrium prices in period 0 from any effect that may be due 
to fundamental links between asset markets, the terminal period values of assets 
6The VaR-based rules may not be “worse” than other portfolio rules in terms of their impact on the asset 
price dynamics. In the partial equilibrium framework, VaR rules do not seem to produce portfolio rebalancing 
dynamics that are very different from a variety of other portfolio management rules (see Schinasi and Smith, 
2000).PORtfOLIO COnStRAIntS AnD COntAGIOn In EMERGInG MARkEtS
357




1) = 0 
for any i,k ∈ {A, B, Z}.
The equilibrium analysis presented in Section III focuses on the derivation of 
the market clearing prices for emerging market assets A and B for a given mix of 
investors participating in both mature and emerging markets. Assuming that both 
assets A and B are infinitely divisible and available to investors in fixed (inelastic) 
supply, let SA and SB denote the supplies of assets A and B, respectively, and let   
DJ,A and DJ,B denote the aggregate demands by investor group J for assets A and B, 
respectively. Then, the market clearing conditions are 
J ∑DJ,A = SA and 
J ∑DJ,B = SB.
Each investor group is assumed to consist of a large number of investment funds, each 
with an initial capital of unity. Because each fund’s capital is small relative to the 
supply of assets A and B, fund managers act as price takers in both markets.
Types of Investors
The fund manager’s portfolio optimization problem is defined by (1) investment man-
date, (2) performance criteria, and (3) portfolio management rule. A particular 
combination of 1–3 is usually chosen to align the incentives of the fund manager 
with the risk-return preferences of end investors. Thus, the manager’s compen-
sation is typically linked to the performance of his or her investment portfolio, 
while investment restrictions are chosen to minimize “excessive” risk taking by 
the portfolio manager. For instance, a risk-averse end investor may want to make 
sure that the fund manager’s compensation is increasing in the expected portfolio 
return and decreasing in the variability of portfolio return (as in the risk-return trade- 
off rule, described below).7
Investment mandate
The fund manager’s investment mandate typically specifies the asset class that he or 
she can invest in (that is, equity or fixed income instruments in a particular country 
or region) as well as restrictions on the use of leverage (short-sale constraints). For 
example, dedicated EM equity funds are allowed to invest only in the locally traded 
shares or American (Global) Depositary Receipts issued by the EM companies.
Performance criteria
The fund manager’s performance criterion can be either absolute—measured as the 
return on capital under management—or relative—measured as the return on the 
fund’s investment portfolio in excess of the benchmark portfolio return.
7An extensive literature on delegated portfolio management explores various ways in which the incen-
tives of fund managers can be aligned with the preferences of end investors (under different assumptions 
about risk aversion and information asymmetries). The detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the 
scope of this paper. In what follows, the analysis will focus on the rules and restrictions that are standard in 
the finance literature, and no distinction will be made between “investors” and “fund managers.”Anna Ilyina
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The majority of institutional investors, including pension funds, endowments, and 
various collective investment schemes, are allowed to use only minimal leverage and 
only temporarily (short-term bank credit or implicit in the derivatives positions) or no 
leverage at all. In contrast, hedge funds and the proprietary trading desks of investment 
banks may establish long or short positions in any asset market. Investment funds that 
are not allowed to use leverage are often referred to as “real money” funds.
The institutional investors shown in Table 1 represent the main types of port-
folio managers that currently operate in the international capital markets. Most real 
money funds also tend to be benchmarked against a particular index, whereas those 
fund managers that are allowed to use “unlimited” leverage (hedge funds, etc., 
where leverage is limited only by the internal risk management guidelines) tend to 
be absolute-return driven.8
Because the EM fund managers are often benchmarked against a particular EM 
index, let RI denote the gross return (per unit of capital) on the benchmark portfolio 
consisting of assets A and B: RI ≡ αRA + (1 − α)RB, where α ∈ [0,1] is exogenously 
given, as the weights are typically determined by the proprietor of the index and are 
only modified periodically.9
Portfolio management rules
Portfolio management rules are designed to ensure that the incentives of portfolio 
managers are aligned with the preferences of end investors in terms of the risk-return 
properties of the investment portfolio. In what follows, we will consider two portfolio 
8However, with the recent regulatory changes in the asset management industry, the boundaries between 
mutual funds and hedge funds are beginning to blur. For example, in the United States, the decision by Congress 
to repeal the short-sale restriction for mutual funds in 1997 and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s deci-
sion to expand the allowable securities list for mutual funds led to the appearance of the first long-short mutual 
funds in 1998. Some of these “next generation” mutual funds are also reportedly using limited leverage and 
limited incentive fees, and are commonly referred to as “hedged mutual funds” (HMFs). According to industry 
experts, assets under the management of HMFs grew from $2.4 billion in 1998 to about $6 billion in 2002, which 
was still a very small fraction of U.S. mutual fund industry assets (around $4 trillion, as of end-2002).
9The commonly used EM benchmark indices are the JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Indices for EM 
bonds and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market Indices for EM equities.
Table 1.  Asset Managers’ Investment Mandates and Performance Criteria
  Investment Mandate
Performance  Global/     
Criterion  real money  EM/real money  Global/leveraged  EM/leveraged
Relative return  Pension funds  EM mutual funds  …  …
Absolute return  …  …  Global hedge funds  EM hedge funds
      Proprietary trading  
          desks
Source: Prepared by the author.
Note: EM = emerging market.PORtfOLIO COnStRAIntS AnD COntAGIOn In EMERGInG MARkEtS
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management rules that are commonly used in the fund management industry: the risk-
return trade-off rule and the tracking-error variance minimization rule.
The risk-return trade-off rule gives a portfolio manager the flexibility to select 
both the return and the risk of the portfolio. For instance, for an absolute-return-driven 
investor, this rule is an outcome of the following optimization problem:
maximize E R aVar R
P P ( ) ( ), −
1
2
where a denotes the coefficient of risk aversion.
For fund managers whose performance is measured relative to the EM bench-
mark portfolio, the risk-return trade-off rule would be an outcome of the following 
optimization problem:
maximize E R R aVar R R




Another rule that is commonly used by relative-return funds is the tracking-error 
variance minimization (TEV) rule. This rule requires that fund managers achieve 
a certain target level of outperformance over the benchmark index, while minimizing 
the volatility of the “tracking error,” that is, the variability of the difference between the 








− ( )≥ ,
where k is the minimum (or target) level of relative outperformance. In the extreme 
case, the fund manager tries to “shadow” the benchmark index, which is often 
referred to as passive investing.10
The Definition of Contagion
Although there are many types of shocks that could affect asset fundamentals and 
be transmitted to other asset markets via portfolio rebalancing by common inves-
tors, this paper focuses on the demand/price response induced by one specific type 
of shock—a volatility event. Following Schinasi and Smith (2000), we define a 
volatility event at time t as an increase in the (conditional) variance of an asset’s 
return at time t + 1.
Because the main concern is a potential sell-off in one of the emerging markets on 
the back of portfolio rebalancing by common investors in response to a shock origi-
nating in a fundamentally unrelated market, the following definition of contagion 
will be used throughout the paper. In the equilibrium context, contagion is defined as 
10According to the International Organization of Securities Commissions report (IOSCO, 2004), 
“Passive management encompasses benchmark funds, which follow some indices with a very tight tracking 
error.”Anna Ilyina
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a simultaneous decline of the current period prices of asset i (P
i
0) and asset j (P
j
0) in 
response to an increase in the (conditional) variance of the value of asset j (P
j
1).
Thus, to transmit a volatility event from market j to market i, the investor’s 
optimal demand function for asset i has to have a nonzero sensitivity to an increase 
in the (conditional) variance of asset j. For example, in the case of a negative sen-
sitivity, the investor would prefer to reduce his or her demand for asset i when the 
(conditional) variance of return on asset j goes up.
II.  Optimal Investment Rules
Overview of the Main Results
Table 2 gives an overview of the key results of the partial equilibrium analysis. 
More specifically, it shows three different types of the EM real money funds subject 
to the short-sale constraints and the sensitivities of their optimal demand functions 
for asset A to a higher (conditional) return variance of asset B. For those investors 
whose performance is measured relative to the EM benchmark index, the term 
“overweight” (O.W.) refers to the investment position in an asset that exceeds the 
benchmark portfolio weight of this asset, and the term “underweight” (U.W.) refers 
to the investment position in an asset that is below its benchmark portfolio weight. 
For certain configurations of parameter values, it may be optimal for the EM fund 
manager to be fully invested in assets A and B, in which case the “no-borrowing 
constraint” is binding and cash holdings are zero.
The main results presented in Table 2 are
•  Relative-return EM funds that follow the risk-return trade-off rule react to 
higher volatility in market B by reducing their demand for asset A only when they 
are fully invested in EM assets and asset A is expected to outperform asset B (that 
is, they have an O.W. position in asset A).
•  Relative-return EM funds that follow the TEV rule reduce their demand for 
asset A in response to higher volatility in market B only if they have positive cash 
Table 2.  Sensitivity of Demand for Asset A to Higher (Conditional) 
Variance of the Return on Asset B
  Optimal Allocation Across EM Assets
Performance Criterion/  Cash = 0  Cash = 0  Cash > 0  Cash > 0
Portfolio Management Rule  Asset A = O.W.  Asset A = U.W.  Asset A = O.W.  Asset A = U.W.
Relative return (EM index)
Risk-return trade-off rule  Negative  Positive  0  0
Absolute return
Risk-return trade-off rule  Positive  Positive  0  0
Relative return (EM index)
TEV rule  0  0  Positive  Negative
Source: Prepared by the author.
Notes: O.W. = overweight; U.W. = underweight; TEV = tracking error variance. All fund manag-
ers are subject to the short-sale constraints.PORtfOLIO COnStRAIntS AnD COntAGIOn In EMERGInG MARkEtS
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holdings, their expected relative performance is at the target level, and asset A is 
expected to underperform asset B (that is, they have a U.W. position in asset A).
•  Absolute-return funds that follow the risk-return trade-off rule never react 
to higher volatility in market B by reducing their demand for asset A. On the 
contrary, they prefer to increase their exposure to an asset if the variance of an 
alternative asset goes up (other things being equal), but do so only when they 
are fully invested in EM assets.
Thus, the relative-return EM funds that are subject to short-sale constraints can 
potentially transmit (negative) volatility shocks across fundamentally unrelated mar-
kets, whereas absolute-return-driven funds do not transmit negative shocks.
How “special” are the circumstances under which the no-borrowing constraint 
is binding and the optimal cash holdings are equal to zero? First, zero cash hold-
ings are optimal for the configurations of parameter values where EM assets are 
expected to outperform the risk-free asset, which does not seem implausible, given 
that the risk premiums on EM assets are generally positive. Second, the dedicated 
EM mutual funds tend to be fully invested most of the time and typically hold small 
positive amounts of cash (around 5 percent of total capital) for liquidity manage-
ment purposes, that is, to meet redemptions.
Opportunistic Investor
Consider the portfolio optimization problem of an opportunistic global fund man-
ager who invests in both mature and emerging market assets (A, B, and Z), whose 
performance is not measured relative to any benchmark index, and who is not sub-
ject to short-sale constraints.
Let RO denote the opportunistic fund manager’s portfolio return, where φ is the 
proportion allocated to asset A, δ is the proportion allocated to asset B, and η is the 
proportion allocated to asset Z:
R R R R R
O A B Z M = + + + − − − ( ) φ δ η φ δ η 1 .
The portfolio optimization problem is
max
( ) ( ) ( )
, , φ δ η
φ δ η φ δ η E R E R E R R
a




φ φ δ η
2 2 2 Var R Var R Var R
A B Z ( ) ( ) ( )
,




































The main properties of the opportunistic fund manager’s optimal portfolio allo-
cation are as follows:
•  The fund manager has a long (short) position in a risky asset if its expected risk-
adjusted excess return is positive (negative).
•  Higher risk aversion induces the fund manager to scale back risky asset positions.Anna Ilyina
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•  Higher return variance of any risky asset induces the fund manager to scale back 
exposure to that asset, but does not affect other asset positions in the portfolio.
Thus, when fundamental values of assets are uncorrelated, portfolio rebalancing by 
opportunistic investors does not transmit volatility shocks across unrelated markets.11 
In what follows, the optimal behavior of opportunistic investors will be compared with 
the optimal behavior of other types of investors who face portfolio constraints.
The Relative-Return Investor with the Risk-Return Trade-Off Rule
Consider the portfolio optimization problem of an EM fund manager who is bench-
marked against the EM index, follows the risk-return trade-off rule, and is not allowed 
to short-sell assets or borrow cash.
Let RD denote the gross return on the portfolio of an EM fund manager, where 
λ is the proportion of capital invested in asset A and τ is the proportion of capital 
invested in asset B, with (1 − λ − τ) being the proportion held in cash:
R R R R
D A B M = + + − − ( ) λ τ λ τ ( ) ( ) ( ). 1
Let RD − RI denote the total excess return on the EM fund’s portfolio over the 
benchmark portfolio return:
R R R R R
D I A B M − = − ( ) + − + ( ) + − − ( ) λ α τ α λ τ 1 1 .
The expected excess return and variance are
E R R E R E R R
D I A B M − ( )= − ( ) + − + ( ) + − − ( ) λ α τ α λ τ ( ) ( ) 1 1
and
Var R R Var R Var R
D I A B − ( )= − ( ) + − + ( ) ( ) λ α τ α
2 2 1 ( ) ( ) .
Given that the fund manager follows the risk-return trade-off rule and is subject 
to the short-sale constraints, the optimization problem is as follows:
max
( ) ( ) ( )
, λ τ
λ α τ α λ τ − ( )+ − + ( )( )+ − − ( ) E R E R R
A B M 1 1



































11This may not be the case for other types of shocks. For instance, Schinasi and Smith (2000) show 
that leveraged risk-averse investors tend to scale back their risky asset exposures in response to a “capital 
event” (capital loss).PORtfOLIO COnStRAIntS AnD COntAGIOn In EMERGInG MARkEtS
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Proposition 1:12  Consider the solutions of the optimization problem (1) such that 
the optimal holdings of both risky assets are positive.
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A B 1 α
the no-borrowing constraint is binding and the optimal portfolio weights are
λ α τ *
( ) ( )
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the optimal portfolio weights are



















B + − ( ) 1 α
Interestingly, the optimal deviation from the benchmark portfolio allocation does 
not depend on the value of α. This implies that two fund managers who start out with 
portfolios in which the weights are determined by different benchmark indices (dif-
ferent α’s) would make the same trades, given that they have the same beliefs about 
asset fundamentals.13
Thus, Proposition 1 implies that relative-return fund managers tend to move closer 
to the benchmark index when either the return volatility or risk aversion increase. 
Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2 describe the sensitivities of the EM fund manager’s optimal 
portfolio allocation to the changes in the level of risk aversion and conditional volatili-
ties of the asset returns.
Corollary 1.1:  Consider an optimal portfolio allocation with positive cash hold-
ings (Proposition 1B):
(a)  The fund manager has an O.W. (U.W.) position in a risky asset whenever its 
expected return is above (below) the return on cash. When E(RA) < RM and 
E(RB) < RM, the fund manager has U.W. positions in both assets and holds cash.
(b)  Higher risk aversion reduces the demand for a risky asset if the fund man-
ager holds an O.W. position, and increases the demand for a risky asset if 
the fund manager holds an U.W. position.
(c)  Higher variance of the return on a risky asset reduces the demand for this 
asset when the fund manager has an O.W. position and increases the demand 
for this asset when the fund manager has an U.W. (but positive) exposure.
12All proofs are in the Appendix.
13This is similar to the result obtained by Roll (1992).Anna Ilyina
364
(d)  Higher variance of the return on a risky asset has no impact on the demand 
for an alternative risky asset; that is, there are no volatility spillovers.
Corollary 1.2: Consider an optimal portfolio allocation with zero cash hold-
ings (Proposition 1A):
(a)  The fund manager has an O.W. (U.W.) position in asset A whenever E(RA) > 
E(RB) (E(RA) < E(RB)). If the expected returns on two risky assets are equal, 
the optimal portfolio weights are equal to the benchmark portfolio weights.
(b)  Same as (b) in Corollary 1.1.
(c)  Same as (c) in Corollary 1.1.
(d)  For O.W. positions, the demand for the risky asset is decreasing in the 
variance of the return on an alternative risky asset. For U.W. positions, the 
demand for the risky asset is increasing in the variance of the return on an 
alternative risky asset.
Thus, for a certain range of parameter values (Proposition 1A), the tendency of 
the fund manager to move closer to the benchmark allocation in response to higher 
uncertainty about asset returns may cause volatility spillovers across unrelated mar-
kets. Consider a portfolio allocation in which optimal holdings of both EM assets 
are positive, with an O.W. position in asset A and an U.W. position in asset B. Suppose 
there is a shock to market B that causes an increase in Var(RB). Then, in response 
to higher Var(RB), the fund manager would prefer to reduce exposure to asset A and 
increase exposure to asset B. Alternatively, suppose that there is a shock to market 
A, which causes an increase in Var(RA). Then the optimal reallocation would still 
involve reducing exposure to asset A and increasing exposure to asset B, because 
this would bring the fund manager’s portfolio allocation closer to the benchmark 
allocation.
Thus, the relative-return EM fund manager who follows the risk-return trade-off 
rule and is fully invested in assets A and B would be forced to scale back the O.W. 
(but not U.W.) positions in response to a volatility shock in a fundamentally unrelated 
asset market. This means that only outperforming (but not underperforming) asset 
positions would be negatively affected by a volatility event in an unrelated market.
The Absolute-Return Investor with the Risk-Return Trade-Off Rule
Consider the portfolio allocation problem of an absolute-return EM fund manager 
who is not benchmarked against any index, follows the risk-return trade-off rule, 
and cannot take short positions. The optimization problem is
max ( ) ( ) ( )
, λ τ
λ τ λ τ λ τ E R E R R
a
Var R
A B M A + + − − ( ) − + 1
2
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Proposition 2:14  Consider the solutions of the optimization problem (2), such 
that the optimal holding of at least one risky asset is positive.
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the no-borrowing constraint is binding and the optimal portfolio weights are
λ*
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Whenever cash holdings are positive (Proposition 2B) the absolute-return real 
money EM fund managers behave in the same way as opportunistic investors, except 
that they cannot short-sell assets. When cash holdings are zero (Proposition 2A), 
λ* is increasing in Var(RB) and τ* is increasing in Var(RA). Thus, when the optimal 
portfolio allocation is such that the EM fund manager has positive holdings of both 
EM assets and the “no-borrowing” constraint is binding, he would prefer to increase 
his exposure to a risky asset in response to a “volatility shock” in an alternative asset 
market.
Thus, EM fund managers who face short-sale constraints but are not benchmarked 
against any index would not transmit negative volatility shocks across fundamentally 
unrelated markets.
14The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1.Anna Ilyina
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The Relative-Return Investor with the TEV Rule
Consider the portfolio optimization problem of an EM fund manager following the 
tracking error variance minimization (TEV) rule, that is, the fund manager has to 
minimize the variance of tracking error conditional on a given level of expected 
outperformance relative to the EM benchmark index. The dedicated EM-TEV fund 
manager’s optimization problem is as follows:
max ( ) ( ) (
, λ τ





1 Var R Var R














− ( ) + − + ( ) ER ER








 1 λ τ
,
where parameter k is the target level of outperformance, which is assumed to be 
positive and strictly greater than the return on cash.
Proposition 3:  Consider the solutions of the optimization problem (3), such 
that the optimal holdings of both risky assets are positive.
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both the no-borrowing constraint and the performance constraint are binding and 
the optimal portfolio weights are
λ α τ *
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where C = Var(RA)Var(RB) and D = (E(RA) − RM)2 Var(RB) + (E(RB) − RM)2 Var(RA), 
the optimal portfolio weights are
λ α τ **
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Corollary 3.1:  Consider an optimal portfolio allocation with positive cash 
holdings (Proposition 3B):
(a)  The fund manager has an O.W. position in a risky asset whenever its expected 
return is higher than the return on cash.
(b)  The size of the optimal deviation from the benchmark portfolio (O.W./U.W.) 
does not depend on the benchmark index weights (α), but does depend on 
the target level of relative outperformance (k).
(c)  For O.W. positions, the demand for a risky asset is decreasing in the return 
variance of an alternative asset, whereas for U.W. positions, the demand for 
a risky asset is increasing in the return variance of an alternative asset.
In contrast with the EM fund manager who follows the risk-return trade-off 
rule, the optimal allocation of an EM-TEV manager is such that U.W. asset posi-
tions exhibit negative sensitivity to volatility events in alternative asset markets, 
whereas O.W. positions exhibit positive sensitivity to volatility events in alternative 
asset markets. This is because volatility spillovers are generated when the constraint 
on the expected level of outperformance vis-à-vis the benchmark index (but not the 
no-borrowing constraint) is binding. Note that when both constraints are binding 
and cash holdings are zero, the TEV fund manager does not react to any changes in 
(conditional) volatilities of EM assets.
Thus, a volatility event in one market may force the EM-TEV fund manager to 
scale back exposure to a fundamentally unrelated asset, when the latter is under-
performing. Such behavior is likely to exacerbate the selling pressure in an under-
performing market and magnify asset price volatility.
III.  Equilibrium Framework
The analysis of the optimal investment rules for different types of portfolio manag-
ers, derived in the previous section, suggests that certain combinations of portfolio 
constraints can create a “link” between the fund manager’s exposure to a risky asset 
and the (conditional) variance of an alternative risky asset held in the portfolio, even 
when asset markets are fundamentally uncorrelated. Such a link could serve as a 
mechanism for the transmission of negative volatility shocks across markets.
In this section, this phenomenon will be investigated in an equilibrium context. 
To illustrate how the transmission of negative volatility shocks through portfolio 
rebalancing by common investors can produce contagion, consider two types of fund 
managers operating in both emerging markets: (1) relative-return EM fund managers 
with the risk-return trade-off rule and (2) opportunistic investors. In what follows, the 
analysis will focus on the case when dedicated EM investors are fully invested in EM 
assets and hold zero cash (Proposition 1A).
Suppose that N dedicated EM funds and M opportunistic funds are present in both 
markets A and B. In what follows, the net return on cash is normalized to zero. It is also 
assumed that dedicated EM funds start out with their benchmark portfolio allocation, 
and therefore their net demands for asset A (that is, λ* − α) and for asset B (that is,   
τ* − (1 − α)) are entirely driven by the need to rebalance their portfolios in response to 
new information about asset values.Anna Ilyina
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Assuming that asset supplies in both markets are inelastic, the market clearing 
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clearing prices.
Proposition 5:  Suppose that the number of opportunistic investors (M) is such 
that M



















, then the market clearing prices of assets A and B are
well defined (positive).
Intuitively this means that, in order for both markets to clear, the number of 
opportunistic investors must be sufficiently large.
Proposition 6:  In equilibrium, dedicated EM investors prefer to have an
O.W. position in asset A when 









> , and an U.W. position in asset A when
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The left-hand side of equation (6) is the ratio of the expected return on asset A to 
the expected return on asset B, given the market clearing prices. Thus, the EM dedicated 
investors prefer to have an O.W. position in asset A when this ratio is greater than 1.
Now, imagine that only opportunistic funds are present in markets A and B. Then
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Proposition 7:  Suppose that M
































(that is, the dedicated EM investors prefer to have an O.W. position in asset A),
then the market clearing prices of both assets A and B are decreasing in σ
2
B.
The main implication of Proposition 7 is consistent with the results of the partial 
equilibrium analysis; that is, whenever the EM fund managers’ optimal portfolio 
allocation is such that they have an O.W. position in asset A, the market clearing 




Thus, when dedicated EM investors have an O.W. position in asset A and their 
no-borrowing constraint is binding, an increased uncertainty about the fundamen-
tal value of asset B forces them to scale back their exposure to asset A, putting 
downward pressure on the price of asset A. At the same time, higher (conditional) 
variance of the value of asset B (σ
2
B) induces investors to reduce their demand for 
asset B as well, which results in a simultaneous decline of both EM asset prices 
(contagion).
IV.  Conclusions
The results presented in this paper provide further support to the notion that 
the design of investment guidelines for institutional investors, which often has 
a narrow investor-protection focus (the single fund manager’s perspective), 
should also take into account the impact of portfolio rebalancing (induced by 
these rules) by a large number of fund managers on the asset price dynamics. 
A better understanding of these implications would involve a simulation of the 
dynamic interaction of different types of institutional investors facing portfolio 
constraints.
Some of the conclusions that emerge from the analysis presented in the paper 
are related to the roles of different types of institutional investors in emerging 
markets:
•  The analysis confirms that opportunistic investors can play a stabilizing role in 
asset markets when other market participants that (collectively) have significant 
market power face tight portfolio constraints. This can happen, for instance, 
because opportunistic investors can take a contrarian position in the face of a 
sell-off by real money funds reacting to a shock originating in a fundamentally 
unrelated market.
•  The analysis presented in the paper also suggests that the inclusion of EM securi-
ties in global equity or bond indices may not necessarily reduce the volatility of 
portfolio flows to the individual EMs. Although it is true that the inclusion of EM 
securities in global benchmark indices can broaden the investor base for these 
assets, it can also increase the volatility of flows owing to portfolio reallocations 




Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem (1) can be written as follows:
L E R E R R
a
A B M = − ( )( )+ − + ( )( )+ − − ( )
−
λ α τ α λ τ
λ
( ) ( ) 1 1
2
− − ( ) + − + ( )    + − − ( ) α τ α ϕ λ τ
2 2 1 1 Var R Var R
A B ( ) ( ) ,
where ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the no-borrowing constraint. Assuming that 
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The complementary slackness condition and non-negativity constraint are
ϕ λ τ ϕ 1 0 0 − − ( ) = ≥ , .
Thus, if the no-borrowing constraint is not binding, that is, λ + τ < 1, then the multiplier must be 
ϕ = 0. Alternatively, if the multiplier is positive, that is, ϕ > 0, the no-borrowing constraint must 
be binding, that is, λ + τ = 1.
Suppose that ϕ > 0 and the no-borrowing constraint is binding, that is, λ + τ = 1. Then, the 
optimal value ϕ* derived from equations (A1) and (A2) and λ + τ = 1 is
ϕ*
( ) ( )
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=
− ( ) + − ( )
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The optimal portfolio weights λ* and τ* are
λ α τ *
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Suppose that the no-borrowing constraint is not binding, that is, λ + τ < 1 and ϕ = 0. Then, 
the optimal portfolio weights are
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Proof of Proposition 3
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem (3) can be written as follows:
L ER ER R k
A B M = − ( ) + − + ( ) + − − ( ) − ( )
− − ( )
γ λ α τ α λ τ
λ α
1 1
2V Var R Var R
A B ( ) ( ) , + − + ( ) ( )+ − − ( ) τ α ϕ λ τ 1 1
2
where γ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
λ α τ α λ τ − ( ) + − + ( ) + − − ( ) ≥ ER ER R k
A B M 1 1 ,
and ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
λ τ + ≤1.
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The complementary slackness conditions and the corresponding non-negativity constraints are 
as follows:
ϕ λ τ ϕ 1 0 0 5 − − ( ) = ≥ , ( ) A
and
γ λ α τ α λ τ γ − ( ) + − + ( ) + − − ( ) − ( ) = ≥ ER ER R k
A B M 1 1 0 0 , . (A6 6)
Suppose that γ > 0 and ϕ = 0, then the optimal values λ**, τ**, and γ** derived from equa-
tions (A3), (A4), and (A6) are
γ**
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Note that because it was assumed that ϕ = 0, it must be the case that λ + τ < 1, or
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k ER R Var R k ER R Var R
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A M B B M A
A M
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< 2 2 0
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, 0  we have to consider
a possibility that the no-borrowing constraint is also binding.
Suppose that ϕ > 0 and γ > 0, then the optimal values α*, τ*, ϕ*, and γ* derived from equa-
tions (A3)–(A6) are
ϕ*
( ) ( )
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− ( ) + − ( )     2k ER R Var R ER R Var R
ER
A M B B M A
A − − ( ) ER
B 2 ,
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2 2
1
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A B ( ) ( )
. and  Because
cash holdings are zero (that is, 1 − λ − τ = 0), ϕ(−Var(RA) − Var(RB)) = 0. But the latter can hold 
only if ϕ = 0, which contradicts our assumption that ϕ > 0.
Suppose that none of the constraints are binding, that is, ϕ = 0 and γ = 0, then λ = α and   
τ = (1 − α). But then it must be the case that the no-borrowing constraint is binding, which con-
tradicts our assumption. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Let x = P
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The market clearing prices can be rewritten as follows:
P
M N aS F
M G
P




+ ( ) − ( )
⋅
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= − ( ) + ( ) −
F
M G
F M aS M N aS B A A A A A
,where
σ µ σ µ σA A A B B B B B B M aS M N aS
2 2 2 2 ( )+ − ( ) + ( ) − ( ) σ µ σ µ σ
and
G M aS M aS B A A A A B B B = − ( ) + − ( ) σ µ σ σ µ σ
2 2 2 2 2 2
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0) depends on the sign of the numerator. It is
straightforward to verify that when  M

















 F is positive for any parameter





Proof of Proposition 6
The demand for asset A evaluated at the market clearing prices, that is,
µ µ σ µ µ σ A B B B B A A A M N aS M N aS M N + ( ) − ( ) − + ( ) − ( ) + ( )
2 2 2 µ µ σ
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2 2 ,
is positive whenever 










The demand for asset B evaluated at the market clearing prices, that is,
µ µ σ µ µ σ B A A A A B B B M N aS M N aS M N + ( ) − ( )− + ( ) − ( ) ( ) + (
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is positive whenever 










Proof of Proposition 7
Differentiating P –A
0 with respect to σ
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Differentiating P –B
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where F and G are shown to be positive for any well-defined market clearing prices (see














and  are negative whenever Q < 0.
Because M
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B, SA, SB, which implies that Q < 0.
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